on the economy. With decreased environmental regulation, it is unclear whether the new federal effort can prevent significant deterioration of the nation's waters. This Comment will discuss recent legal and political developments concerning water pollution control. It will analyze, in light of the diminished federal effort, how the courts' treatment of different issues will affect the pollution abatement effort. Additionally, its aim is to suggest how an intelligent enforcement approach may prevent the degradation of our waterways.
I. THE DECREASING FEDERAL EFFORT TO ABATE WATER POLLUTION
A.
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
The Reagan Administration in its first six months acted to diminish the federal government's role in the abatement of water pollution. The President's actions will reduce resources available to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which oversees most pollution abatement programs. Shortly after taking office, President Reagan postponed the implementation of the "Midnight Regulations" promulgated by executive agencies during the last days of former President Carter's term but which had not yet become effective. 5 Additionally, agencies were ordered not to issue new regulations for at least sixty days. 6 President Reagan also announced the formation of a Task Force on Regulatory Relief to review the efficiency of the "Midnight Regulations." ' 7 The Task Force has already postponed two major water pollution regulations. 8 President Reagan then issued an Executive Order designed "to reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations, [and to] increase agency accountability for regulatory actions. . . ."9 This order gave the increasingly important Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the power to review and order revisions of regulations thought to be particularly burdensome. OMB has already singled out for extensive review more than forty major EPA regulations. Nine regulations, sev-3,200 of the 10,381 full-time employees, a 31% reduction in agency manpower from 1981.16
C. EPA REORGANIZATION The federal pollution control effort has also been reduced by the recent EPA reorganization. The Office of Enforcement, committed solely to the prosecution of violators of environmental laws, was eliminated in 1981.17 The individual enforcement divisions of different offices, including the new Office of Water, will now enforce environmental laws.' 8 Although EPA Administrator Gorsuch claimed that the reorganization was ,effected to "streamline" operations, the elimination may substantially decrease the enforcement program, a critical aspect of EPA's abatement effort. ' 9 The elimination of the Office of Enforcement and the placement of enforcement coordination in an office formerly devoted only to defensive litigation could lead to a less active enforcement approach. Further, the dispersal of enforcement responsibility in the various offices will doubtlessly detract from a coherent, unified enforcement effort. As former EPA Administrator Douglas Costle said, " [I] t [the reorganization] may paralyze the EPA." '20 Moreover, EPA officials recently declared that all criminal enforcement actions must be reported and cleared through EPA headquarters prior to prosecution.
2 1 This new requirement of a "Case Opening Report" and a "Monthly Investigation Report" will delay and impede the enforcement effort because of the time required to review each action. 22 Further, it will diminish the federal enforcement effort by giving greater control over the enforcement program to top EPA officials who were appointed because of their commitment to the Reagan Administration's 16 N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1981, at A20, col. 1. This decrease will be accentuated by EPA's projected annual loss of six percent of its members due to attrition. Reacting to the decreases in spending and planned employee reductions, former EPA Administrator Douglas Costle said, "This is not a question of saving money for the budget, this is a wrecking crew at work." . 22 "The introduction of a two tiered review process in Headquarters. . .will only serve to add time to the process and complicate the coordination of the referral." Memorandum from Director, Enforcement Division, EPA Region V, to Acting Director, Office of Criminal Enforcement, in response to proposal of a new review system for criminal cases (Apr. 13, 1981).
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[Vol. 73 philosophy of reducing agency interference with industry. 23 The number of prosecutions, then, will be determined by the top officials' decision to approve or refuse to allow prosecution. 24 The reorganization and reporting requirements have already led to a significantly decreased enforcement effort. In 1980, EPA referred 230 cases for prosecution. In the eight months since Gorsuch has been in command, EPA has referred only forty-two. 25 D. ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON EPA Although EPA's pollution abatement program has been diminished primarily by actions taken by the Reagan Administration, prior measures, including the Equal Access to Justice Act, may also impede the enforcement effort. 26 Passed in 1980 and taking effect on October 1, 1981, the Act requires government agencies to pay attorneys' fees and related costs to individuals and small businesses in regulatory cases when the proceeding was not "substantially justified." ' 27 The Act, which 23 Although Gorsuch explains her actions in terms of "streamlining" and reducing inefficiency, her actions have demonstrated that environmental protection is not a high priority. Since taking office, Gorsuch has cut spending on every major program, including the one that she says deserves top funding priority-the "superfund" to clean up abandoned toxic dump sites. "She has also urged major retrenchments in the Clean Air Act; . . .she proposed a three-year delay and substantial weakening of impending carbon monoxide emission standards .. " TIME, Jan. 18, 1982, at 16. Gorsuch's critics do not believe that efficiency has been her only motive. "William Carney,. . . ranking minority member of the Science and Technology Committee's subcommit-" tee on natural resources. . . complained of'disturbing signs of late' emanating from the EPA that its commitment to environmental protection 'may be wavering' . . . . Carney said the reorganization and appointments [to top EPA positions] indicated a reduced emphasis on enforcement and 'a more pro-industry stance than has been taken in the past.'" [1981] Moreover, Representative James J. Florio, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism, which oversees several EPA programs, has demanded Gorsuch's resignation because the "massive program reductions, severe personnel cuts, and gutting of regulations demonstrate that she has no intention whatsoever of carrying out her obligations under the law." [1981] 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 811.
24 Most lower level staff members appear more firmly committed to environmental protection than Gorsuch. Interview with EPA Attorney (Jan. 31, 1982). Since she began restructuring EPA and dismantling EPA programs, over 10% of EPA staff members have resigned. Moreover, Time magazine reports of "dismal morale" among staff members, and that some unhappy employees are leaking controversial memorandums to the press revealing Gorsuch's crippling actions. TIME, Jan. 18, 1982, at 16. See also WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 1981, at 36, which notes the tension between a deregulation-minded Gorsuch and staff members seeking a continued strong pollution control effort.
25 TIME, Jan. 18, 1982, at 16. 26 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1980). 27 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1980) . "The test of whether or not a Government action is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness. Where the Government can show that its case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be made." H.R. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980). was designed to be "an instrument for curbing excessive regulation and the unreasonable exercise of Government authority," '2 8 may cause regulatory agencies to initiate fewer proceedings.
Section 504(d)(1)(A) of the Act authorizes the appropriation to each agency of funds to cover fees and costs awarded to plaintiffs, but Congress has not yet allocated any funds for this purpose. Without appropriated funds, agencies such as EPA would have to pay awards out of their own operating funds. EPA may therefore be reluctant to risk its dwindling resources for the payment of fees, and thus may refrain from prosecuting due to the possibility that the action might be deemed "substantially unjustified. '29 Faced with reductions in funds, postponement of major regulations, elimination of the Office of Enforcement, and a deregulation-minded Administrator, EPA may be unable to control water pollution. While funds and regulations are disappearing, water pollution problems are not. 30 To prevent significant deterioration of the nation's waters, EPA must utilize its diminished resources in an efficient enforcement scheme. Equally important, the courts' treatment of environmental issues will have a large impact on the enforcement effort. The following sections of this Comment will present a brief overview of major water pollution laws, discuss how the courts' treatment of issues affect enforcement, and suggest how EPA may attempt to prevent further degradation of our waterways.
II. OVERVIEW OF WATER POLLUTION STATUTES
Two federal statutes have been used in water pollution enforcement actions. One statute, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (Refuse Act),31 prohibits the discharge or deposit of "any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom . . . into any navigable waters.
'32 Although initially used to prosecute creators of obstructions to navigation, in the late 1960's the Refuse Act was applied to proscribe industrial pollution. Section 411 provides for a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $2,500 and/or imprisonment for one year or less, for any person or corporation violating or aiding and abetting a violation of the Act. One issue, of particular importance in light of the decrease in EPA resources, 4 1 is whether the EPA Administrator has a mandatory or a discretionary duty to take action against a violator after finding a violation of a FWPCA provision. The few courts addressing the issue have not consistently interpreted section 1319. If future courts construe the duty imposed as mandatory, then the Administrator would be required to take action pursuant to a finding of a violation. This requirement would limit the attempt by EPA headquarters to reduce the number of enforcement actions.
In Sierra Club v. Train ,42 a citizen's suit brought to compel the EPA Administrator to issue pollution abatement orders, the Fifth Circuit held that section 1319(a) (3) imposes only a discretionary duty to issue an abatement order. The court discussed the voluminous legislative history of the FWPCA, finding that the Conference Committee had accepted a House amendment which provided that the Administrator was authorized to initiate civil and criminal proceedings, whereas the Senate bill had provided that section 1319(a)(3) required him to take action.
3
The court failed, however, to consider all of the pertinent legislative history. During the Senate's discussion of the Conference Committee Report, Senator Muskie, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Public Works, stated that although the change in language made civil enforcement discretionary, it did not affect the Administrator's mandatory duty to issue an abatement order:
It is important to note, however, that the provisions requiring the Administrator to issue an abatement order whenever there is a violation were mandatory in both the Senate bill and House amendment and the Conference agreement contemplates that the Administrator's duty to issue an abatement order remains a mandatory one. [Vol. 73 duty. 55 Whereas 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (3) of the Clean Air Act states that the Administrator "may" take action upon finding a violation, section 1319(a)(3), the corresponding provision of the FWPCA, provides that the Administrator "shall" take enforcement action. The court concluded that this different wording showed that "Congress very deliberately intended to impose more under the FWPCA than just the discretionary duty which the Clean Air Act imposes on the Administrator. The duty intended to be imposed is a mandato y one."1 56 Further, the court rejected the analysis of the Train opinion because it failed to consider Senator Muskie's comments. In light of EPA's less active enforcement of environmental regulations, consistent treatment of this issue could substantially affect EPA's role in the pollution control effort. If the Administrator has a discretionary duty to issue abatement orders or take other action, as Train holds, and if the Administrator's policy is to reduce agency interference in business decision-making, then EPA could minimize the number of enforcement actions merely by electing not to act upon findings of violations.
The South Carolina opinion, however, is more compelling than Train; it accurately relies on the legislative history, persuasively construes the provisions of the FWPCA, and presents important policy considerations for imposing a mandatory duty on the Administrator. Courts therefore should follow South Carolina and require that the Administrator act upon finding a violation.
This result would encourage prosecution of violations under the FWPCA. It is not EPA headquarters, but rather the regional offices which authorize the investigations of possible violations. 5 8 Since the staff members in the regional offices appear committed to the pollution abatement effort, 59 they will probably continue to investigate violations. 60 Once a finding of a violation is made, 6 ' EPA would then be required to act against the violator, either by the issuance of an abate- 1982) . However, because EPA will have less manpower and money to investigate potential violations, EPA will doubtlessly discover fewer violations than it has in the past.
61 Neither section 1319(a) (3) nor EPA regulations define a "finding." Rather, a finding is ajudgment made at the regional level that a discharger has violated the FWPCA. Because EPA does not have the resources to act on all violations, EPA will find a violation in the "high priority" cases where the polluter has discharged substantially or consistently more than his ment order or by the institution of civil or criminal proceedings. Thus, despite the reduction in resources and the anti-regulatory philosophy of top EPA officials, EPA could still enforce the permit requirements of the FWPCA.
B. WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATOR MUST, BEFORE INITIATING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, ISSUE AN ABATEMENT ORDER?
A related issue is whether, after finding a violation of a permit condition, the EPA Administrator must first issue an abatement order or take civil action before pursuing a criminal remedy. The courts' treatment of this issue takes on added significance when considered in conjunction with the present decreases in funding and EPA manpower. shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both." The Act does not specify whether an abatement order or civil proceeding must precede the initiation of criminal charges.
The three courts that have directly addressed the issue have held that the Administrator need not take prior action before initiating criminal proceedings. In Un'ted States v. Phelps Dodge Corp. ,63 the district court discussed the conflicting legislative history and concluded that the Administrator could initiate criminal proceedings without first issuing an abatement order or taking civil action. The court noted that in the House debate on this provision, one Congressman stated that a criminal action could not be brought unless the Administrator first issues an permit condition allows. Thus, a finding results from a balancing of different factors such as availability of resources and egregiousness of the violation.
A related issue, briefly discussed in South Carolina, is whether the Administrator himself must find a violation or whether the Administrator may be deemed to have made a finding from the receipt of information from outside sources such as public interest groups, other agencies or citizens. The Administrator had not made an express finding, but rather had learned of the violation from plaintiff South Carolina Wildlife Federation. The court skirted the issue, stating that for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, it could not, as a matter of law, hold that no finding had been made. 457 F. Supp. at 130.
South Carohlna and Hofman illustrate that an outside party may compel the Administrator to act against a violator if a finding has been made. More often, however, public interest groups or citizens merely alert EPA to investigate a potential violation. Because these outside parties do not have the authority to enter a plant to determine whether the corporation complies with its permit, and because they lack the expertise to analyze effluent discharges, outside parties rarely can accurately determine that a discharger is violating a permit condition. Instead, the outside parties notify EPA about potential violations. Because investigations are performed by regional staff members, rather than by top EPA officials, the complaints will probably be acted upon. Interview with EPA Attorney (Jan. 31, 1982 the decisions are supported by the courts' stated policy of refusing to impede the criminal enforcement effort. If courts follow these precedents, EPA could seek criminal sanctions without first having to issue an abatement order or take civil action. This streamlining of enforcement procedure will facilitate prompt criminal prosecutions, essential both to preserve evidence of the violation and to ensure the greatest amount of deterrence. 73 Moreover, if EPA is not required to engage in a two-step enforcement procedure-first issuing an order and then deciding whether to prosecute-it can quickly bring charges against a violator. This streamlined process would lead to greater deterrence of potential violators who would not have the benefit of first receiving an abatement order before having to comply with discharge regulations. 74 These decisions are of particular importance in light of the dwindling EPA resources. The threat of immediate criminal prosecution will deter a greater number of potential violators. Such additional deterrence is necessary to prevent dischargers, aware of EPA's inability to prosecute all violators, from disregarding permit requirements.
C. THE ROLES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Because of diminished EPA resources and enforcement efforts, 75 the pollution abatement program will be weakened unless other government agencies and departments enforce water pollution laws. A recent decision 76 approving a criminal prosecution initiated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) may lead to greater DOJ participation in the enforcement effort. Such DOJ assistance could mitigate the effects of EPA's retreat from an active prosecutorial role.
In most FWPCA criminal cases, EPA investigates the alleged violation and makes the initial decision to prosecute the violator. Prior to the reorganization of EPA and elimination of the Enforcement Division, the Legal Section Chief of the regional office would confer with a litigation screening committee to decide whether criminal proceedings were ap-73 The deterrent effect is reduced when there is a great delay between time of violation and time of conviction. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 40, at 1. 74 This strategy is essential for the deterrence of single-incident, "Midnight Dumping" violations of the FWPCA, where the detection of the violation and identification of the dumper may be difficult or impossible. "Midnight dumping" occurs, for example, when a chemical disposal company unlawfully discharges toxic chemicals into a waterway. If EPA first had to issue an abatement order, then the company could possibly clean up the discharge before criminal charges could be brought. This would not deter the next company, which could discharge subject only to the risk of receiving an abatement order. If EPA prosecutes the discharger immediately upon discovery of the discharge, however, companies would be less likely to pollute. The details of the post-reorganization procedure have not yet been resolved, but EPA will continue to refer cases to the Office of the U.S. Attorney after it has decided that criminal proceedings are warranted. 7 9 Thus, EPA will still investigate violations and decide initially whether the violator should be prosecuted.
EPA efforts may be supplemented by increased participation in the criminal enforcement effort by DOJ. The Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980 (Appropriation Act) provides that "The Attorney General may, with the concurrence of any agency or Department with primary enforcement responsibility for an environmental or natural resource law, investigate any violation, of an environmental or natural resource law of the United States, and bring such actions as are necessary to enforce such laws." 80 The court in United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, 8 ' relied on the Appropriation Act to uphold a criminal enforcement action initiated by DOJ, notwithstanding the fact that the FWPCA authorizes only EPA to act after finding a violation. In Oxford, the defendants were charged with, inter alia, violating section 1311(a) of the FWPCA. The U.S. Attorney had investigated the violation and had decided to prosecute, relying on assistance from EPA's Surveillance and Analysis Division. The defendants contended that this prosecution violated their substantive due process rights because the U.S. Attorney, not EPA, started the investigation and decided to prosecute. Rejecting this argument, the 77 ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 40, at 7-9.
78 Id (In EPA memorandums and in Oxford, the agency and the court refer to the Office of the U.S. Attorney and DOJ as the same entity. Although it is confusing, this Comment refers to the different departments as they are referred to in the memorandums and in Oxford). In approving DOJ's decision to prosecute, the court emphasized that EPA was substantially involved in the investigative stages, the Surveillance and Analysis Division contributed heavily to the data gathering process, and the Regional Administrator of EPA acknowledged and permitted this assistance. 84 The court noted that because of "the support that the EPA provided and the concurrence in the enforcement division," it could not conclude that EPA would have proceeded in a different manner had the case been handled in accordance with the usual procedures. 85 In the absence of evidence that the Administrator's discretion was deliberately bypassed, the court held that the unusual procedure did not render the prosecution invalid. Oxford, however, does not allow DOJ to investigate and prosecute violations in total disregard of EPA's enforcement role. The Appropriation Act authorizes DOJ to act "with the concurrence of any agency or Department with primary enforcement responsibility for an environmental . . . law. .... -87 The court did not define "concurrence" but implied that initiation of proceedings by DOJ would be permissible when there was substantial cooperation between DOJ and EPA. Subsequent judicial constructions of the word "concurrence" will determine, in part, how much independence DOJ will have in the initiation of criminal proceedings. If courts hold that EPA must participate significantly in prosecutions, then DOJ's role could be minimized by EPA's current passive enforcement effort. 88 demonstrated his commitment to preventing street crimes, but has not indicated whether DOJ will continue to prosecute environmental violators.
9 2 Because water pollution remains a serious problem, and because EPA is neither able nor willing to adequately confront it, it is imperative that DOJ investigate and prosecute violations of the FWPCA.
IV. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES: THE MOST EFFICIENT APPROACH
While the courts' treatment of the issues discussed above will partially determine the effectiveness of the pollution control program, another important factor is the efficiency of the enforcement approach. This section of the Comment discusses the most efficient means of inducing compliance from municipalities and corporations. 95 Id at 86. The CEQ report studied the impact on health of dangerous chemicals, such as, carbon tetrachloride, found in drinking water supplies, concluding that "medical and scientific evidence suggests that there are no safe levels of exposure." Id The report further stated that different synthetic compounds, if ingested in small quantities in water, could cause dizziness, nausea, and sometimes blindness. The report then discussed such factors as level of exposure, toxicity of the chemicals and other factors which affect the severity of the illnesses.
96 Indeed, there has been little enforcement-civil or criminal-against municipalities. Stephen Schroeder, former EPA enforcement attorney, testified at the EPA enforcement program hearing held by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee, on Environmental and Public Works, stating that in light of the fact that municipal facilities significantly affect water quality, EPA has unwisely failed to enforce the FWPCA against municipalities and other government agencies. Schroeder stated, "there has been virtually no formal enforcement" against government facilities. [Vol. 73
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charge reports to EPA, while the city pleaded nolo contendere to similar charges. The discharge reports, signed by both the former superintendent and the mayor, stated that the city was discharging effluents in compliance with its permit condition. The former superintendent was fined $1,500, while the city was ordered to pay only $20 in court costs.
00
Despite the fact that the mayor signed the reports, the court refused to fine the city, stating that the mayor did not know that the reports were false.1ot
In United States v. Little Rock Sewer Committee,1 0 2 the court upheld the conviction of the Sewer Committee for knowingly filing a falsified discharge report. The Plant Superintendent who had falsified the reports was convicted under section 1319(c) (2) and sentenced to one year of probation.' 0 3 Although no committee member knew that the reports were falsified, the Committee was placed on probation for two years, subject to the maximum fine if it failed to bring the sewage system into compliance within a reasonable time. There are fewer barriers to the imposition of civil sanctions against municipalities. Recent decisions have rejected arguments that 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b), imposing liability on "any owner, operator, or person" in charge of a facility from which oil is discharged, does not apply to 10 8 an action to recover civil penalties imposed for the unlawful discharge of oil, the district court analyzed section 1321 and its legislative history, finding that Congress "clearly intended" that municipalities be subject to civil liability.109
Courts have also imposed substantial fines on municipalities. In California v. San Francisco,1 10 the city of San Francisco was held liable for polluting state waters under a California law modeled after the FWPCA. Several unio's had struck, prompting the city to close its sewage treatment plants out of fear of the danger posed by unskilled operators running the plants. In six days, the city discharged 426,470,000 gallons of untreated sewage into the bay and ocean. The surrounding waters accumulated dangerously high levels of pollutants, damaging marine life and harming several citizens. The state sued for civil penalities pursuant to the California Water Pollution Code, 1 11 which "implements the Federal Water Pollution Control Act." ' 112 At trial, the court ruled that once the State proved a violation, "it became defendant's burden to establish . . . that the amount of penalty imposed should be less than the maximum."
' 1 3 The state was awarded the maximum civil penalties of $500,000, which the trial court remitted to $350,000. In other cases involving municipal violators, courts have construed the FWPCA in a manner which facilitates civil enforcement. In City of Baton Rouge v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 620 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1980), the city sought court review of an EPA abatement order requiring the city to submit a program to prevent the continued violation of its discharge permit condition. The court dismissed the city's petition stating that orders were reviewable only where section 1369(b)(1) of the Act specifically authorized review. Baton Rouge, then, allows EPA to issue abatement orders without judicial interference.
In United States v. City of Colorado Springs, Colorado, 455 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Colo. 1978), the prosecution sought to permanently enjoin the city from violating its permit condition. The city claimed that since EPA had delegated to Colorado authority over the permit system, the federal government was required to notify the state of the city's violation before bringing suit. In dismissing this claim, the court said that the "compelling public policy behind the Act" required a liberal interpretation of the FWPCA and held that the government could either notify the state or proceed directly by suing the city. [Vol. 73
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the FWPCA and held that the maximum possible penalty was $60,000, which the court then imposed.
114
Although the court construed the FWPCA in favor of the city by reducing the fine, the court upheld the trial court's unusual ruling on the proof of damages.
1 5 The court said that the alteration of the burden of proof was justified "in exceptional cases where the effectuation of public policy requires it. This is clearly such a case."" 16 Finally, the court reversed the trial court's decision that the striking unions would be liable for all of the damages under a theory of indemnity. The court held that the damages would be apportioned between the city and the unions on the basis of respective fault.
Although the effectiveness of the civil enforcement scheme will largely depend on the severity of fines imposed, the municipality's ability to pay fines, and the government's ability to collect them, civil enforcement may be the most efficient means of inducing municipal compliance. Massachusetts Bay, City of New York, and California v. San Francisco facilitate civil enforcement of pollution regulations and suggest that courts are not reluctant to impose civil penalties. In addition, civil enforcement presents fewer obstacles than does criminal enforcement since the burden of proof for civil violations of the FWPCA is "preponderance of the evidence," rather than "proof beyond a reasonable doubt. " ' 7 Furthermore, the prosecutor does not need to prove negligence or intent since neither are elements of civil offenses under the FWPCA." 8 As one commentator noted, "Thus, pleading is simplified and the application of a civil penalty becomes a more streamlined and efficient process. ' 242 (1980) , which discusses the difference between civil and criminal fines. To determine whether a penalty is civil or criminal, courts inquire whether Congress intended to establish a civil penalty. Where Congress has so indicated, courts next inquire "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." Id at 249. The Court in Ward found that section 132 1(b)(6) of the FWPCA-which imposed penalties for discharges of oil or other hazardous substances from any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility-was civil in nature. 123 the Eighth Circuit broadly construed section 1321 (b) (5) of the FWPCA to hold a corporation liable for its failure to notify the government about oil spills from the corporation's loading facility. While section 1321(b)(5) provides that the "person in charge" may be subject to criminal sanctions, the court said that Congress intended liability under the Act to extend to corporations.
1 24 Further, although only the supervisor of the loading facility witnessed the spill and no directors or officers learned of the spill until notified by the Coast Guard, the court held the corporation liable for its failure to notify the government on the ground that "the knowledge of the employee is the knowledge of the corporation."' ' 25 While this is a basic rule of agency law, 126 its application here is significant because Apex marks the first time that vicarious corporate criminal liability has been imposed under the FWPCA.
127
The broad language of Apex, coupled with the court's willingness to impute the knowledge of a loading facility supervisor to the corporation, suggests that other corporations may be held liable for the acts of lower level employees. Extending liability here creates "an important incentive for a corporation to train and supervise its employees on the reporting requirements of the Act. While Apex "could arguably be cited as authority for the broad proposition that the knowledge of even a low echelon employee may be imputed to the corporation,"' 33 Little Rock extends liability to the corporation because the individual falsifying the reports was a high level employee.' 3 4 Though imposing vicarious liability on different grounds, Apex and Little Rock provide support for decisions holding corporations operations of each department. The board can not ensure that each department complies with regulations; rather, it concerns itself with whether each department is meeting production targets and objectives. The employees, in turn, do not attempt to comply with regulations; "It is these 'immediate' goals and objectives that determine the horizons and interests of the workers there [of each department]; it is their fulfillment of them that will determine their progress up the corporate ladder." C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 44 (1975) .
Moreover, the insulation of the board prevents it from learning that violations have occurred. " [T] here is a natural tendency for 'bad news' of any sort not to rise to the top in an organization." Id at 45. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, in large corporations, it is difficult to locate the source of a violation. Thus, the board can not train employees to comply with regulations where it is unaware of violations or cannot locate their source.
129 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
130 Although respondeat superior is ordinarily applied in civil cases only, it is a form of vicarious liability whereby "the crimes of any employee. criminally liable for the environmental misdeeds of both low and high level employees.
Efectiveness of Criminal Sanctions
A crucial issue is whether the imposition of criminal liability will induce compliance through increased deterrence. If it does not, the application of Apex and Little Rock will not aid the pollution control effort.
The Apex Corporation was placed on probation for three years and fined $20,000, $15,000 of which was stayed on the condition that the corporation comply with all pollution regulations during that period. The Little Rock Sewer Committee was placed on probation for two years.' 3 5 These sanctions induced compliance in the instant cases, 13 6 but an effective criminal enforcement scheme must also deter other corporations from violating the FWPCA. Imposing criminal sanctions on corporations may not induce sufficient compliance. One theory posits that criminal sanctions are ineffective because the traditional deterrents to crime cannot be applied to a corporation. First, society can not imprison a corporation. Second, the moral stigma of the label of "criminal" is not applicable to polluting corporations; pollution has been traditionally regarded not as morally wrong, but rather as a crime merely because it has been declared illegal.
1 3 7 Moreover, because an entity, not an identifiable individual, is breaking the law, concepts of moral blame do not attach. 38 Whereas society views murderers as criminals, it has traditionally viewed a polluting corporation as merely a profit-maximizing organization which has decided either that expenditures on costly pollution control devices are simply not profitable, or that they may force the termination of the business. ' Canal incident, for example, society should no longer view these corporations merely as organizations which made the economic decision not to take precautionary pollution control measures. 1 40 Pollution is a serious offense, and the stigma of criminality can be applied to organizations whose behavior endangers public health. Public concern for environmental quality has not disappeared since the advent of the Reagan Administration.' 4 ' Moreover, corporations have demonstrated concern regarding their public image with respect to environmental issues.' 42 Concern for a positive public image and the possibility that the stigma of criminality may tarnish this image may induce corporations to comply with pollution regulations.
However, because so few corporations have been convicted of water pollution violations, and because violations have rarely been as widely publicized as Love Canal, the fear of public outcry may not as yet be a sufficient deterrent to corporate violations of pollution regulations. Moreover, contributions to public interest environmental groups have increased significantly since President Reagan's election. By June, 1981, the Sierra Club's membership increased 10% since the 1980 elections. During the previous corresponding period, membership increased only three percent. The executive director claims, "People are scared to death. We are getting money hand over fist." The National Resources Defense Council, with 45,000 members, raised $90,000 from contribution requests since the election, doubling that which it received from two mailings the previous year. [M]y company makes chemicals used by municipalities and industries to purify drinking water and treat waste-water. And that's satisfying work-helping people solve their pollution problems.
Second, we're concerned with our own manufacturing methods. Like other chemical companies, we want to make sure that the water we discharge is safe for our rivers.
Ours is. . . . And the job we're doing is improving the environment for all of us. 143 Another factor reducing the deterrent value of prosecuting corporations is the low rate of detection of violations. Typically, corporations can conceal pollution violations through the falsification of reports; it is only where the corporation grossly exceeds its permit condition that the violation will become apparent. Corporate Pmishmenl, supra note 138, at 390-91.
Imposition of Fizes Against Corporations
The Chicago School 1 44 posits that punishing the corporation, rather than the corporate official, will effectively deter corporate crime. This approach requires the establishment of fines at a level where it is more economical for the corporation to implement abatement measures than to pollute and risk incurring fines. The imposition of fines allegedly deters white-collar crime at the lowest cost to society since society expends capital to imprison an individual, while it increases its revenue through the collection of corporate fines.
14 5
One commentator criticizes this approach because it punishes the innocent while sparing the culpable.
1 46 A large fine, which may induce the corporation to remedy its violations, would have adverse effects on others; the fine could lead to "reduced corporate solvency, and increased risk of bankruptcy, possible layoffs and closings of marginal plants, and injury to stockholders and creditors."' 47 Thus, this commentator concludes:
The Chicago School position may therefore show mercy to the corporate executive (who is saved from the possibility of incarceration by the recommendation of a corporate focus), but it imposes a harsh penalty on the less privileged classes (such as employees, consumers, and others dependent on the corporation) who bear the indirect burden of corporate penalties.
1 48
More importantly, the Chicago School position, despite its conceptual validity, presents an unrealistic solution to the real problem of water pollution. Fines will not be high enough to effectuate the deter-144 Coffee refers to the "Chicago School" as the approach offered by Richard Posner, Gary Becker, and other commentators employing an economic analysis of crime and punishment. 
Id
148 Id However, costs are passed on to the "less privileged classes" where a corporation voluntarily alters its operations to comply with existing regulations. Any enforcement scheme which causes a firm to incur compliance costs will result in added costs being passed on to employees, consumers, and other dependents.
Nevertheless, fines and compliance expenditures result in larger costs and thus impose a greater burden on the "less privileged classes" than would be imposed for Coffee also argues that an enforcement scheme based on fines is inherently unworkable because it is impossible to establish fines at a level high enough to match the effective threat of incarceration. Thus, the deterrence level will not be as high as it would be in a scheme in which the threat of incarceration would deter corporate crime. Recently, however, several courts have imposed larger fines on corporations. In Frezzo Bros. 53 the corporation was fined $50,000 and the owners were fined and jailed. In Hudson Farms,' 5 4 the court fined the corporation $50,000, and one official $5,000. In Oxford, 155 the corporation pleaded guilty and was fined $100,000, while the president was fined $100,000 and placed on probation for five years. These convictions and fines may signal a beginning of the imposition of stiffer penalties for violations of pollution laws.' 5 6 Where the possibility of a stiffer fine may outweigh the potential profits saved from failure to comply with federal regulations, these larger fines may deter small corporations.
149 Corporate Crime, supra note 138, at 1366. 150 The proposed federal criminal code seeks to substantially increase penalties for viola-Fines of this magnitude will probably have little effect on large corporations which find it more economical to risk fines than to spend substantial sums of money to comply with existing regulations. Olin Corporation provides a good example. t5 7 Since 1965, Olin has been convicted three times for filing false statements with the government. In 1965, Olin was convicted and fined $30,000 for filing false statements regarding kickbacks paid for drug sales. 158 In 1978, Olin was convicted and fined $40,000 for filing false documents regarding transhipments of arms. 15 9 These "modest" fines did not deter Olin from violating the FWPCA; in 1979, the corporation was fined $70,000, $10,000 for each of seven counts, for knowing falsification of discharge reports filed with EPA. 160 Olin's recurring violations illustrate the practical weakness of an enforcement scheme emphasizing fines; the small penalties imposed have not, and most likely will not, induce compliance from large corporations.t61
Imprisonment of Corporate Ofials
Theoretically, the imprisonment of corporate officials is the most effective deterrent to FWPCA violations. The threat of a prison sentence may induce corporate officials of both struggling and profitable firms to forego substantial profits in order to comply with pollution regulations. 162 While the moral stigma of a criminal conviction may not attach to corporations, businessmen, who value their standing in the community, "are likely to be especially sensitive to the stigma associated with the criminal conviction."' 163 Some commentators claim, however, that business management is not deterred by the threat of imprisonment because judges rarely incarcerate white-collar criminals. One study outlined reasons for this phenomenon. 164 Furthermore, where the corporation's actions subject a substantial portion of the community to health dangers, the community will be even more likely to regard the perpetrator as a culpable individual. [Vol. 73 concerned primarily with preventing others in a similar situation from committing the same act. 1 6 5 Despite this avowed concern, judges refrain from imprisoning white-collar defendants for several reasons. "Most judges share a widespread belief that the suffering experienced by the white-collar person as a result of apprehension, public indictment and conviction, and the collateral disabilities incident to conviction-loss of job, professional licenses, and status in the community-completely satisfies the need to punish the individual."' 66 In addition, judges may feel that a businessman will react more adversely to prison conditions than would other criminals. 167 Judges may also be reluctant to imprison a white-collar criminal because imprisonment would cause hardship to innocent parties, particularly the defendant's family. 168 Finally, the study cited ease of restitution as a factor reducing the liklihood of incarceration.169 Because white-collar defendants typically enjoy a comfortable financial position or have significant earning potential, the defendant could compensate victims of white-collar crimes. Incarcerating the defendant, however, would greatly reduce his ability to compensate the victims. Thus, the study concludes, these factors "bring the judge to a lesser sanction [fines and probation] than would be called for by the deterrence rationale [imprisonment] .
... ,,170
Environmental crimes, however, present additional considerations which should make judges less reluctant to imprison polluters. Whereas most white-collar crimes, such as securities fraud cases, cause financial damage, illegal discharges can also lead to public health hazards. When a corporate official authorizes the dumping of chemicals which leads to increased cancer rates, miscarriages and other health problems, the "need to punish the individual" has not been satisfied merely by an indictment and conviction.
Moreover, the role of restitution is quite different for environmental Although not explicitly stated, the study implies that these lesser sanctions reduce the level of general deterrence because potential violators know that it is not likely that they will be imprisoned for violations.
crimes than for most white-collar crimes. 171 An individual convicted of securities fraud may make full restitution to victims by paying them the amount they were defrauded. An individual who becomes terminally ill as a result of a chemical company's violations, however, will never be fully compensated no matter how much money he receives from the violator.
Finally, because of the possibility of serious illness and the difficulty of reparation, there is a greater need to prevent pollution violations from occurring. Since the damage caused by water pollution often cannot be remedied, judges should imprison corporate officials to ensure deterrence of potential violators.
Indeed, several courts have taken steps in this direction. In United States v. DeRewal, 172 the president of a waste disposal company was convicted of authorizing the pouring of liquid wastes into a storm sewer which emptied into the Delaware River near a Philadelphia water plant. The court sentenced DeRewal to six months in jail, placed him on probation for four and one-half years, and fined him $20,000.173 In another case involving extreme health dangers, United States v. DiZtler, 174 the president of a disposal company was convicted of authorizing the dumping of toxic chemicals into the Louisville sewage system. As a result of the discharge, 161 citizens had to be treated for exposure to the toxic chemicals.1 75 Upon conviction, the court sentenced Distler to a two year term and fined him $50,000. In a case posing less severe health dangers, United States v. Frezzo Bros. ,176 the owners of a mushroom growing and manure composting company were convicted for the discharge of manure-rich water into a nearby stream. The court sentenced the defendant owners to thirty days imprisonment. 177 Cognizant of the dangers of water pollution, these judges were apparently convinced that the violators had not been sufficiently punished by an indictment and conviction alone. Judge Allen, in his sentencing of Distler, said, "No defendant to come before the court has exhibited a more callous and flagrant disregard for the safety and lives of vast numbers of citizens of this area than the defendant."' 178 The judges recog- 173 Id nized that more severe sanctions were necessary to deter the criminal behavior.
C. AN EFFICIENT CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT APPROACH
The water pollution enforcement scheme must maximize the utility of water pollution laws, particularly since EPA now has fewer resources to expend on the costly and time consuming process of prosecuting violators.
7 9 EPA has begun to formulate an efficient enforcement program. One enforcement memorandum outlines the factors to be considered when deciding whether to commence criminal proceedings. 8 0 Two important factors are harm to public health and harm to the environment. 8 1 The memorandum stresses that where environmental harm is minimal, criminal proceedings should not be commenced although there has been a violation. 18 2 However, where the violations subject the public to serious health dangers, then criminal proceedings are warranted. The prosecution of Distler and DeRewal appears consistent with this efficient approach. Significant economic damage is another factor supporting the initiation of criminal proceedings.' 8 4 In Distler, the government spent over $1,500,000 cleaning up the discharged chemicals and the polluted sewage system. 8 5 This type of costly violation could be deterred if potential violators were made aware of the possibility of imprisonment for such violations.
The memorandum also emphasizes the deterrent effect of criminal proceedings: "[L]ong histories of non-compliance or unwillingness to comply with administrative action should be considered for criminal 179 "The cost of trial in pollution cases is often burdensome on the government. In the Ditler case the trial began on November 9, 1978 and lasted through December 26, 1978. There were over six thousand pages of transcript with five volumes of pretrial proceedings (footnote omitted). Federal Enforcement, srupra note 33, at 609. Although unable to give a precise figure, one EPA staff member said that the cost of investigating and prosecuting violators can range from "a couple thousand dollars to hundreds of thousands of dollars." Interview with EPA Attorney (Jan. 31, 1982). Some violations require only minimal investigation and short trials. "Midnight dumping" violations, however, might require considerable investigation and technical analysis to identify the violator, and a lengthy trial might follow. The major costs in criminal prosecutions are expenditures for attorney time, sampling and analysis costs, paper and administrative costs, and costs in hiring experts. prosecution to deter other members of the regulated community from adopting similar courses of action . .. "186 It is imperative that the "regulated community" realize that significant violations of FWPCA will be prosecuted and that civil sanctions are not EPA's exclusive remedy. Thus, the memorandum realistically assesses the limits to EPA's enforcement effort. Because all violators cannot be prosecuted, EPA must prosecute in those cases in which it can minimize the water deterioration likely to ensue from the relaxed water pollution control program.
V.
THE USE OF STIFFER CRIMINAL PENALTIES: EXPANDING CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT POSSIBILITIES
Although criminal enforcement of water pollution regulations has been based almost exclusively on the FWPCA and the Refuse Act, EPA is now starting to rely on other laws which impose stiffer penalties. The imposition of severe sanctions could induce compliance through increased deterrence, even if the number of prosecutions decreases.
EPA can apply several felony provisions to monitor the discharge of pollutants. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides:
Whoever . . . knowingly and willfully falsifies . . . a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent, statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.' 8 7
Section 1001, a general prohibition against fraud, can be applied to prosecute knowing and willful falsification of discharge reports. Although 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) of the FWPCA also prohibits knowing falsification of discharge reports, prosecutions pursuant to section 1001 have the advantage of a stiffer penalty-a maximum fine of $10,000 and/or five years imprisonment-than that provided for under section 1319(c) (2).188 EPA can also prosecute under 18 U.S.C. § 371, a conspiracy provision:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States. . . and any one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or [Vol. 73
Section 371 can be used to deter pollution violations; when a discharger has violated its discharge permit conditions, EPA may claim that the violation was part of a conspiracy to defraud EPA of its lawful regulatory function. EPA has begun to prosecute dischargers under these stiffer laws for alleged violations of various permit regulations. In United States v. Olin Corp. ,190 the corporation and three corporate officers were charged with making false statements regarding the reporting of discharges. The corporation was authorized under its permit to discharge small quantities of mercury into the Niagara River. The reports submitted to EPA stated that the corporation was discharging only permitted amounts of mercury, when it was actually discharging more than the permit allowed. The corporation and the officials were charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 357 and 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). Although the defendants were found guilty under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), they were acquitted of the felony charges. 19 1 In In re GrandJury Proceedings: FMC Corp. ,192 the corporation, its legal counsel, and an environmental manager were charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (obstruction of agency proceedings), 193 for misrepresentation and withholding information about tetrachloride discharges into a nearby river. The corporation pleaded guilty to the charges while the prosecution dropped charges against the two employees. 194 The corporation was fined $35,000 and ordered to create an escrow account of $1 million, which was to be used to study water pollution and its effects on human health. 19 Dropping charges against employees is contrary to the goal of deterring violators, but the $1 million escrow account may have'been a sufficient penalty in this case. Because the maximum fine under the felony provisions is no larger than that allowed under section 1319 of the FWPCA, felony charges are employed primarily for the possibility of imposing longer prison sentences. This benefit, however, cannot be realized with corporations, which can be fined but not imprisoned. 
195
As an alternative or supplement to fines, EPA may settle a case by having the violator create an escrow account. This practical approach ensures that money is paid not to the United States Treasury, but rather is used to study water pollution. 196 As the FMC case demonstrates, however, EPA may employ the felony provisions U.S.C. § 401(3), a criminal contempt provision. 197 In United States v. Coming Fibers, 98 the corporation and its vice-president pleaded guilty to charges of unauthorized discharges (33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1)), knowing falsification of reports (33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), 18 U.S.C. § § 1001, 1002) and the willful violation of a civil consent decree (18 U.S.C. § 401(3)). The defendant corporation had signed a consent decree four years earlier requiring modifications in the operation of its paper mill. The corporation, however, continued operating the mill without installing the required equipment, thereby violating the consent decree, which led to the contempt charges.' 99 Thus, the felony provisions may provide severe sanctions for violations previously deemdd misdemeanors under the FWPCA. It is unclear, however, whether this approach will deter discharges. Of critical concern are the issues of whether the courts will apply the felony provisions and whether they will impose substantial penalties. If courts do impose stiffer sentences, EPA would be able to deter potential violators through the threat of severe sanctions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Budget cutbacks, deregulation, and an unconcerned EPA Administrator have substantially undermined the federal water pollution control effort. The dismantling of pollution abatement programs comes at a time when society is producing and discharging more toxic chemicals than ever before. Unless EPA maximizes its diminished resources in an effective enforcement scheme, the Reagan Administration's rejection of a strong environmental effort will likely lead to significant degradation of the nation's waterways. 
